Friday, February 1, 2013

Single Income No Kids: A Supernormal Stimulus Benevolently Exploiting Ancestral Patterns

Throughout human history until the extremely recent past, a successful pair bond almost always resulted in the birth of many children (around two of whom survived to reproduce). Labor was heavily divided by sex, with women not only caring for children, but also engaging in hard labor for the survival of the family - foraging, farming, or supporting hunting parties with equipment and clothing. Neither women nor men have had much option to do anything other than their assigned, ancestral roles. Presumably, selection somewhat aligned their happiness with the tasks and rewards associated with their roles.

One of the saddest results of modern happiness studies was the finding that while marriage increases happiness, having children decreases it, and happiness does not return to previous levels until the children have left the home. The authors of these studies were surprised to find that even though their control group consisted mostly of couples who experienced involuntary sterility and were childless as a result, they were still happier than married couples with children! (See, e.g., Baumeister, Meanings of Life, at p. 161 and 388-396.) As if the drop in general happiness were not bad enough, the birth of the first child is associated with a large, permanent drop in relationship satisfaction. In earlier times, the presence of children at least decreased the likelihood of divorce; now, each child increases the likelihood that the couple will divorce or break up.

However, as with ancestral gender-based assigned tasks, children were, until the past couple of generations, nearly unavoidable. One made the best of a bad situation, and even found a sense of meaning in it. The sense of meaning may even be proportional to the perceived drudgery and thanklessness of childrearing.

Traditional roles, again on balance from selection, have probably been mostly fine for the majority of humanity throughout time. Women have competed for choice in mating with both their families and with the purchasing power of prospective husbands. However, even the limited mate choice of the past has produced strong pair bonds for ordinary women and men, as is easily seen from modern societies that continue the practice of arranged marriage. The negative things we have read about the traditional sex roles in marriage have mostly been written by extraordinary, unusually intelligent, perhaps male-brained women saddled with poor matches. These unhappy women were more likely to write compellingly about their experiences - and, perhaps, their narratives are more likely to have been placed before us moderns, for reasons to be explored later - than the more ordinary, perhaps more likely content, majority of women.

Some degree of pair bonding is a human universal, but societies vary in polygyny and even polyandry. In monogamous societies with cultural (and material) patterns that favored monogamy, there may have been extra adaptation for strong pair bonding. In modern populations, some are probably more adapted to monogamy than others.

Recently, of course, childbearing has become increasingly optional even within the context of a highly successful pair bond. With the availability of reliable birth control and abortion, few women in developed countries are really forced to procreate.

However, at the same time, sex roles have become more universalized. While women still do the majority of childcare, they are also expected to compete with men in the labor market. In fact, single mothers with children have become one of the most common patterns in developed countries today. Housewives - now euphemized, because reviled, along the usual euphemistic treadmill, as "stay-at-home moms" - are still extant, though radically less common than in previous generations.

What is almost nonexistent is the childfree housewife - a woman who does not do market labor, is supported by her husband, but does not have children. Ours is one of the first generations in which this pattern is even an option; unfortunately, I will argue, few have taken advantage of its considerable appeal.

Most of us are familiar with the lives of those living other patterns - couples who both work, with or without children; single people, with our without children; and those "stay-at-home moms" like my own. Let's explore the unfamiliar, rarely travelled road of childfree housewifery, from a variety of perspectives, to examine who wins and who loses.[Note]

From the husband's perspective, he has a person with whom he is strongly pair-bonded who has the time, freedom, energy, and cleverness to take care of him in all ways. While most of her services might arguably be available on the market (if we include black markets), the attention and skill she devotes to providing them as a result of the pair bond would likely make their market equivalents vastly more expensive. As explored in books like Richard Titmuss' The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy and Lewis Hyde's The Gift: Creativity and the Artist in the Modern World, their very provision in non-market terms may fundamentally change their character.

She may be an amazing cook, carefully attending to his tastes and health and challenging him with her creativity. She may ease his life and increase his comfort (and even status) by maintaining his clothing and their living quarters, at a level of care an arm's-length market stranger would be unlikely to provide (though, from fiction, sleeping with an otherwise forming a romantic relationship with one's housekeeper is hardly an uncommon pattern!).

She may cut his hair, so that he need not pay a stranger for the privilege of being touched with instruments that touch the scalps of hundreds of other strangers. She has the time and energy to maintain her body and looks, and to engage in her own pursuits, creative and intellectual. If they had children, or if she were obliged to do a great deal of market labor, this would not be the case. The benefits of her beauty, achievements, and available energy fall to him, as his willingness to provide for her materially is what enables her to have them.

The working, providing partner well-suited to a childfree single income family, I argue, may essentially have the futuristic equivalent of what is sometimes called a "catgirl" - a pair-bonded, beautiful, clever dream-creature extremely devoted to him - but without the problems associated with the futuristic scenario.

The couple never suffers the drop in relationship satisfaction associated with the birth of the first child, and the burden of each is made lighter and more meaningful by the work of the other. If they are the kind of people who can find adequate meaning in a pair bond and other pursuits, they can successfully avoid the ancestral trap of childbearing - while retaining all the benefits of ancestral caretaking and protection patterns, not to mention all the benefits of modern Dreamtime "zero-th world" society.

The non-working partner, of course, enjoys freedom from the rat race - from market labor and all the energy drains it entails - as well as from welfare loss from childbearing. She is free to forage farmer's markets and exotic grocery stores for cooking ingredients, with plenty of time left after all her (really not unpleasant) caretaking tasks to pursue her own interests. What other women do as expensive hobbies - cooking, sewing, knitting, aesthetic arrangement - she may engage as her main occupation.

Sex acts for women as a gauge of the happiness of their relationships and of general life satisfaction as it relates to their partners. In a situation in which a woman is valued so much that she is taken care of materially and respected for her labors, her satisfaction and wellbeing translate into more sex, to the benefit of both herself and her mate. When her energy and satisfaction are sapped by full-time market work and/or childrearing responsibilities, sexual frequency cannot but drift downwards.

To form a pair bond with a catgirl of one's own level of cleverness is a great privilege toward which many aspire. Few imagine how enticing it can be to BE such a beloved, pair-bonded yet utterly free catgirl.

This pattern is clearly not available to everyone. Many people may not be able to find meaning in life except through breeding. And it may be that only a minority of women are presently capable of the enjoyable, but hardly brainless and undemanding, tasks of housewifery. I also suspect that the monogamy orientation of the male partner (if there is one) most limits such pairings; while female humans may self-modify sexually in many important ways, it may be that only particularly monogamy-adapted males can find deep satisfaction with such a pattern. I doubt men have much control over whether they are such fellows, and certainly do not cast blame on those who are not; however, those without a strong monogamy orientation are excluded from this pattern.

Who loses, then? Why is this pattern so rarely seen, even among those well suited to it?

The main losers are the relevant governments. Market labor and the market exchanges this pattern replaces are taxable events. The satisfaction from this pattern is not at this time taxable. Also, the childfree pattern refuses to produce more "citizens" for the relevant governments to bleed.

Corporations may also lose, for the same reasons: their labor pool is contracted, with some of the most able excluding themselves from it; therefore, labor is marginally more expensive. In addition, non-market provision of services means demand for their products and services decreases - both in this generation and the less-populated next.

This may be part of the reason this pattern is presently rare and reviled, with "housewife," as mentioned above, on a euphemistic treadmill toward necessarily including children in the pattern to remain even close to respectable.

However, a truly free society, I argue, would see much more of this pattern among those well suited to it. It is fucking rad, and I encourage you to consider whether you might be suited to it, and to avoid playing into governments' and corporations' interests by reviling those who freely choose it as their life pattern.



Note.Feel free to mentally change the genders here. While on balance I'd expect most couples capable of enacting this pattern to be as I describe, there are now no rules stating that this must be the case. Lesbian and gay couples, and the occasional gender-reversed hetero couple, may derive the same benefits as the heterosexual couple in traditional roles as described.

Monday, January 7, 2013

Advanced Health Care Directives

This is not legal advice; you should consult an attorney for legal advice in ensuring your end-of-life documents will be respected.

However, I am sharing my own Advanced Health Care Directive (in both a PDF and a Microsoft Word file format) for others to see the language I chose to use to ensure that I am not treated in ways that I do not wish to be treated. After preparing my document, I signed the bottom of each page, signed and dated the second-to-last page, and had witnesses who met the specified conditions sign and date the final page.

My own directive (a) nominates a person I trust to respect my wishes for a quick, natural death to make health care decisions for me, and (b) states my wishes to die quickly and painlessly if this is a possibility. I have used language about this being my "religious, spiritual, and ethical" belief, as it seems to me that such language is more likely to be respected than purely rational philosophical language.

I have also included language asking to be free from unwanted, offensive, etc. touching, by which I mean that any treatment beyond pain management will be considered by me to be a medical battery.

I have included a "severability clause," which means that in the likely case that my wish to die naturally is found to be against public policy and not respected, the rest of the directive should be enforced, meaning my proxy should still be able to refuse care.

Probably the biggest risk is that, contrary to all logic, the fact that I wish to die will be found to be evidence that I was not of sound mind at the time of the creation of this directive. I hope that this is not the case, but it is a real risk in our prohibition society.

I hope you find this document informative.

Sunday, November 18, 2012

Fungibility and the Loss of Demandingness

Certain items demand a great deal from their owners. Significant non-monetary costs must be incurred in order to locate, choose, use, and care for these goods.  Knowledge, aesthetic sensitivity, carefulness, work, membership in an insider community (as with black-market goods or single-tree tea), openness to experience, and even pain (as with tattoos) may be demanded in order to own these items; not just anyone with money may own them.

In return, many of these items - more than items that have only monetary costs - increase the value of their owners. Not only does their ownership and use signal carefulness, expertise, and other values, but owning and using these items actually does increase the owner's value to his group, realized in terms of sociometric status

From objects as well as work, we want not only surface-level "use" or money, but we also want to increase our own value, and we want positive and reliable feedback about this increasing value in ourselves. To the extent that our objects are purchasable and usable by anyone in exchange for the ultimate fungible commodity (money), with few non-monetary costs, they are incapable of increasing our value and delivering reliable messages that they increase our value.

This last point explains an important exception to the overjustification effect. Ordinarily, to the extent that people are given extrinsic rewards for a desirable behavior, they will tend to engage in the behavior less in the absence of rewards, indicating less enjoyment of the behavior. The important exception is if the extrinsic rewards provide reliable, positive information about the self. One interpretation of this exception is that a major desire of humans, not satisfied by extrinsic rewards, is to increase their value and track this increase of value.

The intuition that demandingness creates value is illustrated in two other contexts. First, the longevity of nineteenth-century religious communes has been found to correlate with their degree of demandingness from their members, supporting a costly signaling theory of religious memes. Costly signaling here is not "mere signaling" but, rather, a solution to the problem of how to actually solve complex coordination problems and increase value delivered to all members. Similarly, organizations that use hazing are often of long duration and excite substantial loyalty, supporting the theory that demandingness can create value in this context. Second, demandingness within relationships can increase bonding, a fact that is often explained as an application of the consistency bias, but which is probably more properly seen in light of costly signaling as a solution to a coordination problem.

To sum up, the modern economy is primarily composed of things and services available for money, ratcheting to allow fewer and fewer non-monetary costs. When things are available for money, anyone can acquire them; this dilutes the information about the self that can be contained in the ownership. Similarly, a major trend in the labor market is toward fungible skills that anyone can supply, reducing opportunities for virtuosity and positive information about the self through work. Everything is increasingly available for money, except, I will argue, a major thing we all want to buy that gives us the feeling of meaning: our own value and specialness. 

This is not to say that money has no value to signal about the self. Those without adequate money may experience their deprivation as negative messages about the self. However, someone with adequate money is less likely to get enough positive messages about the self from simply spending money. He will increasingly desire,and increasingly fail to find, outlets that genuinely let him build his value - although expensive illusions about this, as well as escapes from this dilemma, are plentifully supplied.

Work and Virtuosity in the EEA

In the environments in which humans adapted, everyone would have spent a hundred thousand hours doing something demanding that added value to the self in the eyes of the tribe. Everyone would have realized the pleasure of virtuosity. 

None of the ancestral patterns involved email or swivel chairs or levers to pull on machines or cash registers. These modern items of work infrastructure do not invite virtuosity - in fact, they are specifically designed to obviate the need for it! When Robin Hanson suggests that work can be pleasurable enough to give meaning to life, he points to a sushi chef - an example of virtuosity that is so rare and desirable as to be oversupplied even now. How many options for virtuosity in work are actually available in the modern economy? And, more ominously, how many will be available in the future, given present trends? Given that this kind of demanded virtuosity is actively pleasurable, it seems likely that these skills will increasingly turn into costly hobbies, rather than the kind of work one can expect to be paid to do.

The non-fungible skills demanded by EEA work (gathering, hunting, cooking, creating goods and tools and collectible proto-money) and a decreasing fraction of modern work are, in my model, analogous to the non-monetary costs of goods. They are examples of rewarded demandingness. 

I will now turn to certain examples of phenomena and classes of goods in an attempt to hermeneutically flesh out the problem of decreasing rewarded demandingness.

The Aspiration Index

A significant proportion of food that is purchased is not eaten, but rather goes bad and is thrown away. The proportion of a particular food that meets this fate may be seen as its aspiration index - the degree to which it is purchased for self-signaling, for the positive information about the self and future self value it seems to provide at the time of purchase. The more difficulty involved in preparing and eating the food - while still appealing to people unlikely to prepare it - the higher its aspiration index. 

However, if kale or parsnips or rappini are thrown away after going bad, they have failed to add value to the purchaser's life through demandingness. They have demanded something from the purchaser, but because of his failure to provide it, the vegetables have provided only the momentary illusion of adding value to life.

For modern sedentary people, exercise equipment - treadmills, running shoes, punching bags, gym memberships - likely exhibit a high aspiration index. Purchasable for only money, they nonetheless demand high non-monetary costs in their use, costs that frequently go unpaid by the purchaser. Their value is not realized, because their demandingness is not of the sufficiently alluring sort to entice the purchaser to sacrifice to it. 

Musical instruments, books, and language-learning software are examples of items available to purchase for money whose non-monetary costs frequently go unpaid by purchasers, resulting in a forfeiture of their value.

It is likely that when items with significant non-monetary costs are available for mere money - their purchase does not involve substantial non-monetary costs - their aspiration index will be higher, and their value will more frequently be forfeited. However, I also suspect that there are many cues that affect the investment of non-monetary costs, social and otherwise, and finding out exactly what these cues are would likely be a rewarding field of study. Unfortunately, the nearby field of the cues motivating people to buy things has received far more study.

The Kitchen Knife and the Pen

Where do Americans get their knives with which to chop food? What kind of knives do they buy? How do they maintain these knives?

Most kitchen knives are purchased at retail outlets, like most goods. These knives are made primarily of stainless steel, a rust-proof alloy that does not demand much from its user. You can leave it in the sink overnight and it will just sit there, not rusting, shining up at you damply. Unfortunately, stainless steel is  a poor material in terms of taking a sharp edge from sharpening. Indeed, it seems that over the past few decades, Americans have largely lost the skill of sharpening knives at all in their home kitchens. Most home kitchens I have visited contain dull stainless-steel knives, from the cheap knives John Thorne has accused of having "been made to look like a knife rather than to be one" to expensive Wusthofs. 

Knives have become easy, non-demanding, non-functional, and sad. They no longer demand much from their users, but they certainly don't deliver much. I suspect this is why vegetables are increasingly available pre-cut in plastic packages, obviating the need for the home cook to slice them up at all. Vegetables themselves demand less from the cook, simultaneously decreasing the reward the cook can receive.

Carbon steel knives, however, demand significant searching, care, and maintenance from their owners - and reward these demands with the pleasure of cutting and the promise of increasing virtuosity. You are unlikely to find a carbon steel knife at Bed, Bath, and Beyond. To get one, you might have to find the cluttered little shop in Chinatown that sells to restaurants, or the internet equivalent. To choose one, you might have to know what different kinds of knives are for. Once purchased, you have to care for it scrupulously; it cannot be left wet in the sink for twenty minutes, much less overnight, without rusting at you accusingly. 

It will, however, take an extremely sharp edge, if you spend the time to sharpen it. Cutting with it is a project to be sought out specifically - pre-cut vegetables will seem a pathetic waste of the joy of cutting. Its sharpness, and your ability to maintain its sharpness, contributes directly to your value as a cook. 

The market, exemplified by the Bed, Bath, and Beyond I mentioned, removes near "pain" - non-monetary costs and demandingness - and renders items legible to the purchaser without culture, knowledge, or care. This greater fungibility - stores selling pictures of knives - harms the quality of life and the ability of people to increase their value.

Similarly, a fountain pen is a bit of a hassle to fill. The tiniest hassle. It takes a bit of knowledge and a bit of work. Disposable pens obviate the need for this hassle and seem like a great idea, especially since when everyone was using fountain pens, their refilling offered no particular positive information about the self. In the interest of reducing the pain of refilling, the market began to supply disposable pens almost exclusively. You will not find a refillable fountain pen in, say, Target.

Unfortunately, disposable pens were able to get much worse once nobody remembered fountain pens. Ball-point pens, the cheapest sort of disposable pen, require so much pressure that writing is uncomfortable. Pens with a fine felt tip and liquid ink are nice, but hardly something to bond with. 

Often the first time someone writes with a fountain pen, they are surprised at how easy and comfortable it is. All of a sudden, one's hand doesn't cramp from writing! The pain of refilling pens was replaced, insidiously, with the pain of writing with substandard pens. 

Now, a fountain pen is something to be specially located - and the ink as well. Again, a tiny amount of effort must be expended in learning to refill, and refilling, a fountain pen. But all this is rewarded in the greater writing pleasure - not to mention bonding with the object through all that exposure and effort, as with a carbon steel knife. 

A pattern has occurred in the fountain pen market as it shrunk: more and more fountain pens appear designed, not for use, but for pure, referent-less signaling value. The background culture's idea of a fountain pen seems to be something gold-plated, perhaps inlaid with diamonds for good measure, and an ornately engraved nib - and possibly there are more dollars spent on fountain pens decorated non-functionally with expensive (though fungible!) metals than on cheaper, more practical fountain pens designed for use. This is an example of the expansion of a market to be more monetary and less represented by non-monetary elites as consumers, explored in a later section.

The Hipster and the Connoisseur

An archetype of our age is the hipster, a person who is attracted to the obscure because it is obscure, because it is hard to find, obtain, and understand.

The mistake is to view hipsterdom as pure signaling. It invokes signaling, of course, but also the genuine, authentic search for value in genuineness and authenticity. The hipster is a person who is particularly alienated by the world of purely fungible culture. His music and books, his old "vintage" items, are more demanding, harder to find. But at the same time, he is made more interesting and valuable through what they demand from him. 

Similarly, a connoisseur (exemplified in Evan S. Connell's novel The Connoisseur) is a person who seeks out goods that demand something. They may not be had merely for money, but through seeking and discernment. It is not their price, but their authenticity and beauty, that give them value. 

The connoisseur reacts to the scarce, beautiful object in and of itself. The connoisseur does not talk merely about the price of his acquisition; to do so indicates he is not a true connoisseur. The difficult, challenging objects he seeks out pay his effort back. 

The Evolution of SWPL Retail

Certain businesses start out catering mostly to people interested in use rather than signaling - in purchasing difficult items that require substantial non-monetary wealth in order to use. They cater to a certain elite. 

Gradually, in part based on the strength of the very reliable signal set up by the starting population, a different crowd gets interested - one that lacks the non-monetary wealth to bring to the goods purchased, but that nonetheless desires the self-value that they seem to promise. The elite is limited in size, so as the business grows, it becomes more and more dependent upon (and caters to ) the aspirational, signaling crowd. Soon, Whole Foods is selling vegan organic rice crispy treats, soda, and pre-cut vegetables; REI is selling dubious athletic clothing in sizes as inflated as mainstream fashion. 

The value such businesses provide to the core elite, in the cases mentioned, is not destroyed; Whole Foods still sells good whole vegetables, and REI still sells good backpacking gear. But the aspiration index of goods and buyers has increased - they are purchased more and more for the positive messages about the purchaser they seem to provide, rather than for actual use and enjoyment at the object level. The aspirational user may become representative of the class.

The Fungibility of Human Relationships

As mentioned earlier, there has been a trend since the industrial revolution toward less investment in the specialized skills of workers - fewer butchers and artisans per capita, more factory workers and, later, Starbucks baristas. The trend has been for workers to become as fungible and empty of non-monetary investment as the goods they often sell. 

The fungibility of work, the reduction of demand for long-developed special skills, the impossibility of virtuosity in one's limited job, has made work less and less a source of reliable, positive information about the increasing value of the self - because it has ceased to truly improve people. But people still desire to work at what they love, and to improve themselves. The market will sell them the feeling of this, but will not commonly supply them with food in exchange for pursuing virtuosity.

Since no-fault divorce became ubiquitous and dating more short-term and informal, less has been demanded of us in romantic relationships. As with work, this has resulted in romantic relationships producing less happiness and being less rewarding than more demanding ones. Here is an area in which fungibility of people is particularly likely to degrade welfare.

Humans evolved to form pair bonds - a kind of ultimate non-fungibility. Mating for life is hard; co-evolved biological and cultural adaptations help make it possible to maintain this kind of demanding, rewarding relationship. The aspiration toward a lifetime pair bond is still present; it is not, however, matched by social institutions that might enable it. Marriage has become an aspirational good.

Perhaps even friendship and neighborliness have been rendered essentially fungible by increased mobility. To the extent that they have, they have probably also become less rewarding.

However, perhaps a great deal of lived, experienced specialness (non-fungibility), even in our environments of evolutionary adaptedness, has been an illusion that sufficiently abstract thinking reveals. Seeing through specialness that satisfied the ancients would be especially hard on moderns able to do so.

Education and Other Fashions

Compared to other goods, the monetary price of education has skyrocketed in recent decades. At the same time, its market share has expanded drastically. Just as ultramarathons have replaced boring old marathons as the elite test of endurance, graduate degrees have replaced bachelor's degrees as the elite degree of education.

Education, unlike most other goods or services, is mostly composed of messages about the self and of adding value to oneself, real or illusory. The monetary costs increase because it really is, to some degree, scarce. It distorts the overall market by being one of the few items for sale that actually stands a chance of increasing one's value to the tribe.

The demandingness of education, I argue, is part of what you're buying in money. There is a special premium for scarcity (such as Ivy League educations), but this premium is largely still paid in non-monetary costs (intelligence, preparation, work). However, through a lack of barriers (and even an attempt to remove barriers) on consumers, the education market has followed the predictable path of Whole Foods and REI - even at the elite end.

Moreover, as one of the only parts of the market that appears to offer the chance to genuinely, measurably add value to the self, it occupies a greater and greater share of the economy. Unfortunately, it cannot add as much value as it promises. The aspiration index of education is high and growing.

Education is becoming more like clothing. Since clothing has become more mass-produced and cheaper, hence requiring no skill to make, more effort has been put into choosing and buying it. Fashion might create the least value in individuals of any industry. Scarcity is expressed mostly in dollar value and necessarily non-functional addition of recognizably precious, but ultimately fungible, commodities, like gold or brand names.

There are a few non-monetary costs still involved in fashion. Retailers such as American Apparel retain elite status despite being relatively cheap in part because their clothing only comes in small sizes, and only looks good on skinny, healthy people. Elite bodies are demanded, but this is ultimately a superficial, deeply unsatisfying kind of value to have demanded from us. Make-up and fashion "knowledge" is replacing other knowledge as it seems to perceptibly add value to the self; unfortunately, this value is so superficial as to be ultimately unsatisfying. 

Escape from the Self

If reliable, positive information about the improving self is not available to help people feel valuable, people will seek escape from consciousness of their pathetic-feeling selves. A large share of this escape is provided by the entertainment industry, including entertainment electronics. Baumeister, in Escape from the Self, argues that alcoholism, masochism, spirituality, and even suicide are phenomena in which people attempt to escape from painful information about the self - a self that, by the way, has had to bear more of the weight of meaning than when other sources of meaning were commonly available. 

Fewer people are able to get positive, reliable information about their increasing values, and some are more sensitive to the emptiness of certain signals than others. I expect that those unable to get the desired, necessary information - unable to improve their value and feel it - will be more likely to seek out palliation and suicide gambles

How Do People Find Demandingness In Life?

Those who do not escape must find some source of demandingness in order to get information about their increasing value. Much money and effort is spent on competition, an explicit source of costly information about oneself, from athletics to chess. There is a guarantee of a winner and a loser in competitions; the loser's risk is what renders the winner's success valuable information about himself. Vicarious competition (through professional spectator sports) seems adequate for many. 

What I have termed "insight porn" provides important messages about the self and gives at least the feeling of improving one's value, through possessing a better, more compact model of the world and the kind of mind capable of understanding the insight.

Video games, especially massively multi-player games, demand and creatively reward virtuosity through systems of levels and achievements. To some degree, this may be providing a superstimulus, artificial version of increasing one's value; however, in another sense, people may get genuine sociometric status from their online gaming guild. This is unlikely to provide for one's bodily needs for food and shelter, however, so the benefits of improving one's value to the group may be in some ways illusory compared to their evolved function. In fact, gold farming - the excised monetary aspect of gameplay - is reviled and low in status, generally undertaken in poor countries (thanks to the fungibility of their labor with our own, and their lower upkeep costs).

What are the implications of this trend for the future? The desire to add value to oneself is the essence of our kind of social creature. Will people find ways to add value to themselves when everything is fungible, when perhaps anyone can modify himself at will? Or will they discover new and better ways to palliate this need?

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Old Money: Evolutionary Economics and Biophobia in Social Sciences

Author's religious medallion, obverse. Religious endorsement, like government endorsement of fiat currency, may replace materials or labor as scarcity indicators as long as the behavior of others supports this illusion.

In 1898, Thorstein Veblen (of Veblen goods) published an essay on the question of why economics was not an evolutionary science. He referred not only to the biological evolution of human brains, but also (perhaps especially) to the processes by which systems evolve, including the evolution of items of culture.

Veblen mentions (I emphasize, in 1898, when Darwin's bones were scarcely dry) that scientists in the fields of psychology, anthropology, and ethnology must consider economics to be behind the times in its failure to adopt an evolutionary outlook on its problems. In 2012, we may still ask the same question of economics - why has it not become a field dominated by an evolutionary perspective? - but we must also ask what happened to the other social sciences to retard their adoption of a truly evolutionary perspective.

In their 1988 work on the evolutionary psychology of homicide, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson lament what they term the "biophobia" present in the social sciences in their day. Referring to the work of Margaret Mead in creating a myth of pure adaptability and cultural arbitrariness, they say:

What is of interest is how the myth fills a need for social scientists and commentators. It seems to demonstrate that our social natures are pure cultural artifacts, as arbitrary as the name of the rose, and that we can therefore create any world we want, simply by changing our "socialization practices." (This may sound a remarkably totalitarian vision, but it's not, you see, because the new, improved socialization practices will be designed by nice people with everyone's best interest at heart, and not by nasty, self-interested despots.) The social science that is used to legitimize this ideology can only be described as biophobic. [Emphasis in original.]

In 2002, Steven Pinker took up Daly & Wilson's cause in his book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Over a hundred years after Veblen asked why economics was so far behind the other social sciences in adopting an evolutionary perspective, Pinker was left to ask why those other social sciences, so evolutionarily modern in 1898, had dropped the thread in favor of socialization theory and other comfortable, common sense ideas Veblen might have dismissed as "spiritual stability."

Ten years later, the idea that humans have a specific, evolved nature that is unlikely to be changed by arbitrary cultural change is much more widely accepted. Critics of this theory tend to be those who do not like the implications that are drawn from it, rather than those with substantive objections to the theory itself. The most theoretical objection to evolutionary psychology is an allegation of reductionism; this, however, is misplaced.

What is beginning to be acknowledged is that just as human brains have evolved with a specific, genetically determined (though somewhat plastic) nature, items of human culture have also undergone evolutionary adaptation. (The evolution of cultural items may be seen as a special case of sexual selection: the most relevant part of the environment of adaptation is the brains and perceptions of conspecifics, within the constraints of material resources, as with chain letters and ships' rudders. Cultural items, like AGIs, would do well never to lose track of their base realities.) The adapted brain - not a blank slate - constrains, but does not fully specify, the kinds of cultural items that can evolve. To complicate matters more, items of evolved culture have formed a great deal of the relevant environment in which humans have biologically evolved.

Author's religious medallion, reverse.

Old Money

What would economics, the study of the production and exchange of goods (broadly defined), look like if it took a genuinely evolutionary approach to its problems?

A 2002 paper by Nick Szabo entitled "Shelling Out — The Origins of Money" is a thrilling example of how a non-reductive, biologically aware science of economics might approach problems. Szabo traces the appearance of proto-money into prehistory, concluding that the use of collectible items like shell necklaces allowed hunting, foraging groups to specialize in seasonal protein sources and exchange protein with other groups. One of the most exciting, useful observations in the paper relates to the features of proto-money. Collectible items valuable as tokens of exchange must be:

  1. More secure from accidential loss and theft. For most of history this meant carriable on the person and easy to hide.
  2. Harder to forge its value. An important subset of these are products that are unforgeably costly, and therefore considered valuable....
  3. This value was more accurately approximated by simple observations or measurements. These observations would have had more reliable integrity yet have been less expensive.

Szabo especially examines the second feature: difficulty of forgery. Collectible items that necessarily involve considerable human labor and time are particularly hard to forge. He explains how this feature might have caused flints to become the first proto-money:

There are many puzzling instances of useless or at least unused flints with homo sapiens. We have mentioned the unusable flints of the Clovis people. Culiffe discusses a European Mesolithic era find of hundreds of flints, carefully crafted, but which micrograph analysis reveals were never used for cutting.

Flints were quite likely the first collectibles, preceding special-purpose collectibles like jewelry. Indeed, the first flint collectibles would have been made for their cutting utility. Their added value as a medium of wealth transfer was a fortuitous side effect that enabled the institutions described in this article to blossom. These institutions, in turn, would have motivated the manufacture of special-purpose collectibles, at first flints that need have no actual use as cutting tools, then the wide variety of other kinds of collectibles that were developed by homo sapiens sapiens. [Citations omitted.]

The features Szabo identifies are all, he says, features of the metals and coins that have functioned as money, and the reserve commodities that have backed non-fiat currencies. Further, since the advent and widespread use of fiat currency,

It is no coincidence that markets in rare objects and unique artwork — usually sharing the attributes of collectibles described above — have enjoyed a renaissance during the last century. One of our most advanced high-tech marketplaces, EBay, is centered around these objects of primordial economic qualities. The collectibles market is larger than ever, even if the fraction of our wealth invested in them is smaller than when they were crucial to evolutionary success. Collectibles both satisfy our instinctive urges and remain useful in their ancient role as a secure store of value.

Importantly, when the scarcity of items became forgeable (e.g., glass beads introduced to tribes unfamiliar with glass manufacturing), those capable of mass-manufacturing apparent costliness had a material advantage over those who had not yet adapted to detect this sort of forgery. Glass beads "were very popular wherever European colonialists encountered Neolithic or hunter-gatherer cultures," says Szabo.

Author's hand-knitted socks, made from factory-produced yarn.

Szabo's non-biophobic, evolutionarily-aware view of money, with room for both biological and cultural evolution, gives us a new way to see money. In particular, it gives us a new perspective on the labor theory of value.

Mainstream economics generally dismisses the labor theory of value as a fallacy, a cognitive bias to be eradicated (but which stubbornly, stupidly refuses eradication). This is of a piece with the similar dismissal of the consideration of sunk costs as a departure from rationality to be eradicated in rational minds.

Just as the evolutionary, game-theoretical understanding of human cognition has helped (some of) us see the point of the sunk costs "fallacy" (it helps facilitate commitment, which, like Timeless Decision Theory, though apparently irrational, improves welfare), Szabo's evolution-aware account helps us see the function of the labor theory of value: it facilitates the creation and use of hard-to-forge proto-money by inextricably connecting it to the man-hour. Prior to stationary agriculture, populations were relatively stable, and an hour of human effort required relatively stable inputs (including the care and nutrition required to raise and maintain an adult human). Agriculture increased populations, but also increased the opportunity cost of making labor-intensive, decorative items. The man-hour therefore has had a relatively stable value in real-world inputs that made it an ideal basis for proto-currency; sensitivity to this basis would benefit individuals.

Compare the two worldviews. In the mainstream economic view, the sunk costs fallacy and labor theory of value are fallacies that stubbornly resist change. To the evolutionary worldview, these "fallacies" are basic, functional realities of evolved human minds, unlikely to change, that systems must adapt to accommodate if they are to be successful.

In this latter view, mass production is a problem for consumers as well as for workers. Branding and other shenanigans have replaced genuine scarcity in markets for goods. Humans likely have an innate desire to acquire valuable, proto-money-like objects; we likely also have an innate pleasure in creating such goods. Globalization and mass production allows the lesser-valued labor of worse-off others to fulfill our needs for handmade goods, while turning the production of handmade goods into an expensive, commodified hobby for the well off.

Author's hand-spun yarn, with factory-produced hand spindle and roving.

Finally, with the advent of mass-produced food and related technologies like public education and daycare, humans themselves have become items of mass production. I have joked on Twitter that SWPLs think they are creating artisanal humans; paleo diets, along with free-range, unschooling, and the fetishization of the traditional and the offline, are ways we react to the extensive forgery of value in our cultures and ourselves. Fewer of us sing, make music, and dance; more time is spent in offices and less making shell necklaces. The welfare loss is best made apparent with an evolutionary view of economics, which might actually explain why this view has not obtained currency.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

How Innovation is Like Genetic Mutation

Our system of intellectual property, especially the patent system for inventions, prioritizes innovation above other contributions to culture. The patent system (appropriately referred to, I think, as "intellectual monopoly" rather than intellectual property) attempts to allow an innovator to capture the profits that flow from his innovation, largely ignoring the contributions of those who copy and use the technology. 

The conception of copying and using an innovation as "theft" is fundamentally wrongheaded. In practice, throughout human history, copying and use (with slight modifications) is how technology has progressed. Use and copying with modification contributes more value than mere innovation, but is not rewarded (and is actually punished) by our current intellectual monopoly scheme. An analogy to biological evolution is apt: innovation provides the raw material upon which selection (copying and use) acts, in the same way that genetic mutation provides the raw material upon which natural selection acts. We would not expect large amounts of genetic mutation caused by radiation to result in better and better ecosystems; quite the opposite. Genetic mutations are mostly harmful, and even mutations that are successful for an organism can disrupt an entire ecosystem. Radical changes to the ecosystem must follow a major genetic change in any participant organism.

Proponents of the value of innovation would argue that unlike radiation, human innovators can think about the implications of an innovation, designing only those that would result in a beneficial change. This is, I argue, fundamentally hubristic. The ability of humans, even the smartest humans, to mentally project changes into the future is more limited than humans generally acknowledge. The most salient consequences of historical innovations were generally not widely anticipated. 

The success of an innovation is often not apparent at the moment the innovation is conceived. Only in an environment in which appropriate supportive technologies have developed, and after long use, can any particular innovation be considered successful. (See, e.g., the development of the rudder over the past two millennia.)

The problem of the failure to project the effects of innovation has been especially visible in the case of the design of human societies. Utopian societies of the 19th century failed to have an average longevity of even a single human generation, despite the careful planning and effort of concerned individuals. 

A related problem is the size and interconnectedness of modern systems. Many separate ecosystems adapting in different environments would offer some hope of hitting on stable solutions. A single, giant ecosystem, in which everything is interconnected and innovations spread throughout the system immediately, offers much less hope of happening upon a stable solution. Our megasystem limps along, gathering an ever-increasing load of dangerous innovations, and will do so until it no longer can. 

This is not to say that simpler, stabler systems are necessarily better. They are frequently quite awful. Interestingly, however, removing the salient awfulness of a particular simple system often (imperceptibly, over generations) also removes whatever was beneficial about the system. 

There is a fundamental problem with our extremely complex system. Not only has it failed to provide decent lives for its human citizens, but it is not even on a course likely to provide decent lives in the future. Our almost religious focus on innovation as a solution to our problems ignores the manner in which change occurs in large, complex system. 

Friday, September 28, 2012

Life, Pain, and Revealed Preference

Everyone alive suffers, yet most living people seem to be glad to be alive. Few commit suicide, and death is feared by most.

How do we know if the pain of life is made up for by other factors? Introspection is a popular method (especially what I call the "imaginary survey," in which one imagines people's responses to being asked whether they are glad to be born). But introspection is also flawed in terms of accuracy even as to how well one's own life has gone, and introspection does not help us compare the suffering of one person to the happiness of another. 

I have proposed that we look at sources of data other than introspection to figure out how much people really value or lament life and its pains and pleasures (see Mathematics of Misery, Born Obligated, What Kind of Evidence for Effective Suicidality? and Blind to the Downside). We could, I argue, look at how people act, what they buy, eat, smoke, and do. Rather than asking them about their preferences, their preferences might be revealed to us through their behavior.

A recent episode of the Radiolab podcast examined the pain scale used by doctors - a scale to measure a person's pain, from "no pain" to "worst pain imaginable." The podcast reveals the subjectivity of the scale and its inadequacy for making medical judgments; an interviewee imagines the "worst pain imaginable" to be the pain of being dragged behind a pickup truck to one's death, and imagines her pain to be about a third of that; a "3" on the pain scale, subjectively severe and interfering with her life, but dismissed by her doctor.

Her father, a doctor, recommends she report her pain as an "8" in order to be taken seriously. More interestingly, he suggests a more revealing pain scale: one that asked what sufferers would be willing to do to get rid of their pain. Get a really bad haircut, perhaps? Accept a reduced lifespan?

When I was younger, I suffered from severe migraines. In the early days of the internet, I read about trepanation and it seemed like a live option for at least two years; it was my beloved fantasy. A few days into a bad migraine when I was 19, I took the train to Rites of Passage and had a large needle, and then a ring, inserted into the flesh of my navel, hoping it might relieve the pain. (It didn't, though it did take my mind off of it.) Clearly, the revealed preference of a trade-off for pain reflects the subjective value for the person at both ends: I might have been experiencing extremely severe pain to consider piercing my skull and my body, or I might just not disvalue bodily envelope violations very much. However, data about the actual choices of thousands of people would give us evidence of the relative value of different choices for large numbers of people; while not perfect, it would be better than mere introspection.

So is life a burden, or a blessing? What are people willing to do for a longer lifespan, compared to what they're willing to do in order to die? 

In the United States, around 36,000 people successfully commit suicide every year, despite the fact that suicide is illegal (on pain of resuscitation and incarceration in a mental hospital), risky, difficult, and painful, and despite the additional fact that it is illegal for others to help in any way. Worldwide, over a million people successfully commit suicide every year.

Cryonic preservation represents a chance to be reborn; one must still die, but one's brain and perhaps body are preserved in the hope of one day being reanimated. Cryonics is legal and (since it takes place after death) painless, and it is legal for others to help one achieve cryonic preservation. Cryonic preservation costs around $150,000, considerably less than the cost to raise an average American child to age 18 (not including college). In spite of this, only about a thousand people have ever signed up for cryonic preservation. The number of people who have ever signed up for cryonics in the history of the world is the same as the number who die from suicide in the United States every ten days.

While people may go to great lengths to postpone death, they do not seem to reveal a particular preference for a chance to be born again. Indeed, while life in the abstract seems to be of supreme importance, other factors can be shown to drastically outweigh the supposedly sacred value of life. For instance, studies suggest that castration may extend male lifetimes by decades, yet castrating oneself or one's son seems unthinkable, even with the lifespan enhancement effects in mind. While life may be valuable, it seems that sexual capacity, gender expression, and reproductive capacity are revealed as much more important than life simpliciter. 

The fact that so many people are willing to take great risks to end their lives in order to escape the bad parts of life, and so few are willing to make serious sacrifices to be born again or drastically extend life, is evidence that life is not always a blessing, and is frequently, observably, a burden. We should continue to investigate data to determine the lived reality of the value of life and pain, and should incorporate this knowledge into our reproductive ethics. Reproduction can no longer be seen as a purely innocent endeavor, but must be recognized as a very serious gamble with the life of an innocent being.

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Trying to See Through: A Unified Theory of Nerddom

There is a single characteristic, I argue, that defines and unites the cognitive community that you and I share if you are reading this (the community of nerds). These days we often identify as rationalists, skeptics, or atheists, interested in cognition and cognitive biases; we are likely to eat LSD at Burning Man. We read analytic philosophy, science fiction, and LessWrong. We are intelligent, socially awkward, and heavily male. Is there a good name for that?

Lucid Dream

Intelligence and social awkwardness partially explain many of the patterns of our community, but neither is the characteristic I have in mind. This characteristic may be explained by analogy to lucid dreaming (incidentally, a common interest of our members). Dreams ordinarily fool us; despite their incoherence, we accept them as fully real while we are in them. 

With effort, over time, you can get in the habit of performing "reality checks" during waking life: trying to push your fingers through solid surfaces, perhaps, or to breathe with airways closed. When asking, "am I dreaming?" and testing coherence becomes enough of an aspect of everyday reality, you may start performing reality checks in dreams, too. If you are successful, your reward will be an insight denied to most people: knowledge of the fact that you are dreaming.

Dreams demonstrate that our brains (and even rat brains) are capable of creating complex, immersive, fully convincing simulations. Waking life is also a kind of dream. Our consciousness exists, and is shown particular aspects of reality. We see what we see for adaptive reasons, not because it is the truth. Nerds are the ones who notice that something is off - and want to see what's really going on.

Our People

Communal belief - social reality - and the sacrednesses that it produces are precisely the powerful layers of distortion that we are likely to notice (and hence have a chance at seeing through). We are less able than normal humans to perceive social/sacredness reality in the first place, and to make matters worse, we are addicted to the insight rewards that come from trying to see through it even further. Autism is overrepresented in our community; depression, too. Autism is associated with a reduced ability to model other brains in the normal, social way; this failure carries even into modeling the mind of God, as autism is inversely linked to belief in God. The autistic person is more likely than the neurotypical to notice that social reality exists; we might say the autistic person gets a lucid dreaming reality check for the great social dream with every inscrutable (to him) human action he witnesses. 

Mild depression removes pleasurable feelings from everyday life; it interferes with a mechanism for sacredness-maintenance distinct from the theory of mind path autism blocks. Meaning is deconstructed in depression; social connection is weakened. Ideas and things that for normal individuals glow with significance appear to the depressed person as empty husks. The deceptive power of social and sacredness illusions is weakened for the depressed person (as are certain other healthy illusions, such as the illusion of control). This is not necessarily a victory for him, as self-deception is strongly related to happiness; the consolation of insight may not make up for the loss of sacredness in terms of individual happiness. The characteristic that distinguishes us is not necessarily a good thing. Our overdeveloped, grotesque insight reward seeking is likely maladaptive, and is probably not even doing our individual selves any good. Extremists - those most capable of perceiving social/sacred reality - are happiest.

There is no difference in IQ between the sexes - on average. It is only at the high and low ends of the distribution that sex differences show up, with males more likely than females to exhibit very high or very low IQ. The trait of being oriented toward social and sacred reality, however, does likely vary between the sexes on average. Females are more religious than males, and more oriented toward communal belief and social reality. At the extremes, this sex difference is likely even more apparent (as with autism). Members of our community, I argue, select in by being high on the trait of seeing through social/sacred illusions; or, to put it another way, low on the trait of perceiving social/sacred reality. This explains the drastic male skew of our sex ratio better than intelligence.

Recursion and self-reference are uniting themes in our community. We are constantly trying to jump out of ourselves to look at ourselves. Our predilections for abstraction on the one hand, and psychedelic drugs on the other, feed our addiction to insight - to understanding new things about the understander. We do not smoke marijuana just to laugh and eat brownie batter, but for the front-row seats it gives us on our own cognition. We desire insight, but also meta-insight. Because of this multi-layered awareness, we have a complicated relationship with ambiguity: awareness of it, and conflicting desires to embrace it and to stamp it out (as if such a thing were possible). We are aware that information is present on more than one level of abstraction (or sincerity); some of us play the game and communicate on multiple levels at once, and others hold out for legible progress through sincerity.

Our culture's fascination with "meta-" - seeing the next level of abstraction, applying principles to themselves - is identical with this seeing-through trait. Many nominal members of our community have a hard time with this, because they are not true cognitive members of our community. They think of "meta" as when you watch Doctor Horrible at Monster House while dressed as Doctor Horrible characters. That's fine for them, but I think it's important to distinguish between the actual cognitive bases of our community, and the cultural confusion that comes from our culture's over-inclusiveness. 

Science fiction has united our culture for human generations, because it has been a reliable source of insight porn. Philip K. Dick's stories deliver heavy, refined doses of insight, for instance. But there is another layer of something that calls itself science fiction, designed to appeal to a broader audience than the insight-addicted core members, that merely recycles the tropes of science fiction literature and offers no real insight reward. Why are so many of us in love with Julian Jaynes even though it's batshit insane and obviously wrong? Because it's satisfying, amazing science fiction: insight porn that delivers. The fact of its wrongness does not reduce the pleasure it provides, any more than the fictional nature of a lateral thinking puzzle makes it less fun. 

We are aware that we are embodied beings with egos, but we are constantly trying to get around this - all the while realizing, at another level, that we can never truly lose our embodied perspective or think with something other than our evolved brains. Layers of self-glorifying self-deprecation illustrate our complicated relationship with ourselves. 

We are likely to have started out socially awkward - failing to automatically perceive all the social subtleties that our normal cohort noticed instinctively. Some of us have figured out social belonging using parts of our brain not adapted for this purpose; but most of us experience the normal human ache for social belonging, friendship, bonding, and sex, even more so if we have been unlucky in securing it. 

But our attraction to each other is not just an animal desire for company.

We realize the limitations of our individual monkey brains. We wonder if, by linking our monkey brains up with other monkey brains, we might form a Super Brain capable of insight unavailable to us as individuals. We long for not just any old community, but an epistemic community. 

A lot of us get stuck in traps. We become aware of a powerful insight (atheism, feminism, conspiracy theories) and begin to think it explains all of reality. We commit to our hard-won but limited set of insights until they calcify, protecting us from the trauma (and the pleasure) of further insights.

Many of us become heavily invested in already being right, and in others being wrong. This limits our ability to understand the world, since the world contains myriad beings who are all wrong in fascinating ways, and no beings who see only the pure truth. The folklorist Linda Degh inspired me with her writing on the "Apollo Moon Landing Hoax" conspiracy theory; to see her study the belief as folklore, rather than merely condemn it as factually incorrect, seemed like a fertile approach. To move toward reality, it is more effective to study and understand a strange belief than to reject it without study. Examining strange beliefs may be the lucid-dream reality check we need to examine our own normal-seeming beliefs. The most satisfying and useful insight is meta-insight: insight about our own cognitive processes.

The Sad State of Insight Porn

Huge segments of the background human culture cater to stimulating the humor reward circuit; not so for the closely related but distinct insight reward circuit. "Insight porn," to the extent that it exists, is of marginal cultural importance compared to humor, and is generally of much lower quality. Puzzles, mystery stories, perhaps even political commentary, trigger the insight reward circuit in a degraded way; even the lowest pattern-recognition games are capable of it. But its market share is a tiny fraction of that of comedy. We are deprived of art that could satisfy our desires. We must look to each other, and to the world, to satisfy our curiosity, boredom, and confusion with sweet insight. 

Why should it be that art catering to humor is more plentiful and of higher quality than art catering to the insight reward circuit? There is a clear humor sex difference, with men producing more humor (and expected to produce more humor) and women consuming more humor (and expecting to consume more humor). Humor may have implications as a mating quality indicator. Insight is more dangerous, and as I have argued, there may be sex differences in the orientation toward this kind of insight. Unlike humor, women aren't, as a group, especially interested in puzzles and insights; men are both the main producers and the main consumers of insight art like chess problems and strategic games. Humor has been a good characteristic for selection to act on; it is relatively safe and a good indicator of the quality of one's mind. Insight is not so safe, and may even be an indicator against cooperativeness (contrary to the adaptive value of religion, for instance). This may explain why there are dozens of comedy clubs in Los Angeles, but not a single club where one can go to solve lateral thinking puzzles with masters of the genre (if you know of any, please hook me up). Humor can even inoculate us against threatening ideas, such as evolution and religion.  

It is a great thrill to be epistemically pushed off of your reality - to have the universe drop out beneath you, like a carnival ride. We may not exactly believe extraordinary claims, such as the claim that the Dark Ages did not take place, but it is exciting and moving to think how weak and indirect our knowledge of such things truly is. 

In some ways, the domain of visual art has done a better job than the domain of science in promoting the nerd value of seeing through social/sacred illusions. For centuries, art and science were on similar paths, accumulating insights, undergoing paradigm shifts: infant proportions and perspective in art, say, and heliocentrism and germ theory of disease in science. Over the past hundred years, art has endured many iterations of waking up, seeing itself, and eating itself, from cubism to urinals-as-art; science, however, is barely entering the first cycle of meta-science, of examining the implementation of its methods with its own methods. 

Severe mental illness is so common among serious visual artists that it's practically a job qualification; it's rare in the sciences (though less rare in abstract math and philosophy). Of course there are good reasons for this, but the selection effect is cognitively important. Science has done a better job than art (and marginally better than math and philosophy) at protecting itself from radically different ways of thinking, hence insights about itself. 

False Insight as Hypnosis

The popularity of the viral political documentary Zeitgeist: The Movie illustrates that insight porn, properly pitched to the sophistication of the viewer, can have almost hypnotic power. The techniques used to create the illusion of insight in this film may seem rudimentary and clumsy to us, but they are sophisticated enough to trigger the sensation of a major breakthrough in those with less jaded (well, sophisticated) insight-detection mechanisms. Having access to insight just one level up from one's listeners - not too many levels of abstraction up for them to grasp - is a powerful tool. You can see why the ability would exist; our insight obsession has just gone off the rails, perhaps, into superstimulus land. 

The most ubiquitous trick in Zeitgeist is the use of simple pictures to make statements sound more truthful. Though the pictures presented are not probative of anything, their mere presence makes statements feel more like reached-for insights. This technique is used throughout, but nowhere more shamelessly than when Jesus' crown of thorns is revealed to be...solar flares. (At this point technically you have to drink.)

Other than the picture-truthiness trick, the documentary skillfully uses abstraction and far-mode inductions to produce the feeling of insight in naive users. The narrator (aided by illustrations) identifies similarities between past religions (often too quickly to read), attempting to reduce them to patterns. These taxonomied myths are described and owned by the narrator (and, presumably, the viewer), who is now above them in status. Satellite photos give the same impression of abstract understanding. Clips of old movies depicting religious events provide comic relief, emphasizing the superiority of the abstract view presented in the documentary over the silly, obviously incorrect specifics imagined years ago. Simple statements ("This is the Sun.") hypnotize the viewer so that more controversial statements can sneak in. Levels of abstraction are abruptly switched, invoking confusion hungry for resolution. The known and the unknown are combined to produce the feeling of insight in the viewer; if the mood is set right and the right illustration is being projected, an alleged mistranslation can feel like the deepest mystery resolved. When the scary, nasty forces of evil are introduced, near-mode fear is induced with threatening loud noises. A word or phrase is repeated ("there was an explosion") until it is divorced from context and seems more likely to have the meaning the filmmakers desire us to take from it than the meaning we would normally take from it. 

Jesus taught in parables, a bit like lateral thinking puzzles. He didn't simply say "here is the rule guys" - he told a whole story from which you were supposed to make not-always-obvious connections, and he outright admitted that the stories were capable of interpretation on multiple levels. The study of Talmud presents opportunities for complex insights within its intricate logical structure (this is true, though somewhat less true, of the study of law). Insight porn does not have to be true to be effective; it merely has to be geared to the sophistication of its audience, producing insights of the right size. Any given insight may be illusion; reality is best served when we are skeptical of each new insight. 

We have learned to glorify insight itself. If that is our policy, we must avoid clinging to any particular insight or truth. All must be fair game for our hungry insight addictions to feed on. It is painful to have one's calcified insights challenged (as alluded to earlier regarding conspiracy theories), but by belonging to the cognitive community of people like us, don't we consent to this threat of upheaval? We may properly pity the rest of humanity so much that we don't interfere with their healthy, comfortable fixed beliefs, but shouldn't our charity evaporate when we remember that they govern and control us based on their silly sacrednesses? 

The child in the Emperor's New Clothes is one of us. He is most likely autistic - most children, even at a very young age, can feel the social sacredness and act accordingly (perhaps even dogs) - but not this child. It is amazing that the story is preserved. But its form is so neat and tidy, this old tale - it lets us deal with fear and uncertainty surrounding our vague awareness of the social falsity. Does the child find any epistemic peers who agree? The comforting myth is that if one person points it out, the error will become obvious to all and be corrected. More likely, the child is shouted down or executed. We are children calling to each other - in a dog whistle, often, so the bigger group isn't motivated to discipline us. 


Second Addendum: In Which the Author's Attitude Toward Insight Porn is Clarified

This post has gotten around! I have noticed that my tendency to use dysphemisms for things I like has resulted in a widespread misunderstanding - that there is something inherently wrong with "insight porn." On the contrary, I think what I am calling "insight porn" includes the best of human culture.

First, the concern I have with the poorer sorts of insight porn is not that they promise wisdom and fail to deliver, but simply that they are not appropriate for people on the high end of the intelligence/curiosity distribution. Second, my problem, if I have one, is not with insight porn itself; what I have is a suspicion for the feeling of insight in general.

The feeling of mirth (a reaction to humor) is, the authors of Inside Jokes argue, a reward-system response to the detection of a contradiction in one's mental space: one of the premises one had mentally committed to is found to be incorrect. It is the detection of a misfit. Insight, on the other hand, involves the detection of a fit - the detection of a pattern that allows the compression of information previously requiring more representational space. (This hypothesis is considered with regard to music in Nicholas Hudson's paper "Musical beauty and information compression: Complex to the ear but simple to the mind?")

Epistemically speaking, humor is a much safer route than insight to correct thinking. The feeling of humor detects a problem that is unlikely to not be a problem; unfortunately, insight is likely to provide only the illusion of a better, more elegant model of the world. While what I have dysphemistically called insight porn has inherent value in providing the feeling of insight, we should be more suspicious of the feeling of insight as representing greater wisdom or a more elegant, more accurate model of the moving parts of the world. Insight leaps often do provide more accurate, more elegant models of the world, as Hudson points out in the paper previously linked with regard to Darwin, Einstein, and others. But a person who has spend a great deal of his life having the feeling of insight may or may not have a more accurate, more elegant model of the world than someone who has more rarely experienced the feeling of insight. Caution is needed.


Addendum: Some Items of Insight Porn

A collection of insight porn operating at a fairly high level. This list does not distinguish between items which I believe give true insight into reality and those which merely provide the sensation of insight without an improved understanding of reality. Such a distinction may be relevant for other values, but not for the value of triggering the reward circuit I describe.

We rely on others familiar with alien domains to pass us the best stuff from their domains.

  • Julian Jaynes
  • Jean Baudrillard
  • the study of cognitive bias
  • evolutionary psychology, e.g. Daly & Wilson
  • simulationism (back to Descartes)
  • Bladerunner and the questioning of memories
  • Philip K. Dick, especially short stories
  • atheism, Higher Criticism, and religious studies
  • Talmud (Torah & commentaries, living formal domain)
  • Ribbonfarm
  • study of conspiracy theories, e.g. Moon Landing Hoax, Phantom Time Hypothesis
  • folklore (Linda Degh, V. Propp, Dan VanArsdale)
  • Kurt Vonnegut
  • Michael Swanwick (esp. Bones of the Earth)
  • Thomas Pynchon
  • phenomenology
  • lateral thinking puzzles
  • "Synchronicity" (Jung)
  • The Aquatic Ape
  • Roy Baumeister (Meanings of Life, social function of consciousness)
  • contrarianism (insight in part from noticing patterns in belief of others)
  • William Gibson
  • Neil Stephenson
  • Walter Gieseking
  • Monk, Coltrane, Miles Davis
  • lucid dreaming
  • Philippe Rochat's Others In Mind
  • Wisconsin Death Trip (Lesy)
  • Radiolab
  • marijuana
  • ketamine
  • Joseph Cornell
  • Freud's Interpretation of Dreams
  • Infinite Jest
  • John Thorne (e.g. Outlaw Cook)

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Toward Non-Stupid, Non-Blank-Slatey Polyandry

"There is a theoretical debate...over the evolutionary status of human polyandry and whether it is truly an adaptation....We argue that marriage (or pair-bonding) is the adaptation."

Starkweather & Hames, "A Survey of Non-Classical Polyandry" (Human Nature 23:12, June 2012)


Humans are an effectively polygynous species; that is, the reproductive fitness variance of males exceeds the reproductive fitness variance of females. However, our degree of polygyny is not particularly high among primates; we have significant adaptations for pair bonding and monogamy. Daly & Wilson say (Homicide, p. 143) that "we are the products of a mild but sustained polygynous competition."

What about polyandry? Marriage relationships between a single female and multiple males has been understood to be extremely rare among humans, both based on anthropological evidence and for sound biological reasons; Daly & Wilson cite the classical source, Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, for the proposition that "a tiny minority [of human societies] practice polyandrous marriage." Starkweather et al. mention that for the 1967 sample Daly & Wilson are citing, only seven societies are identified as practicing polyandry out of 1,167 societies in the sample. A tiny minority, indeed!

A popular blank-slatey denial of both polygyny and monogamy adaptations (and, some argue, the adaptation of pair bonding in general) has emerged in recent years, known as Sex At Dawn. I have not deigned to read this book, but I am informed and on that basis believe that its authors argue that humans are basically happy love monkeys cruelly forced into the strictures of monogamy by agricultural patriarchy. 

As a happy love monkey, I am, emotionally, extremely sympathetic to this ludicrous line of hogwash. Yes, human males are much bigger than human females, we mate face-to-face, males invest heavily in their children and exhibit violent sexual jealousy, and basically the picture is one of monogamy shading into polygyny - but what about our huge penises, huh? What could they be but beautiful twat squeegees? And what about the fact that cuckolding is the second most common heterosexual interest in pornography, after (the unquestionably adaptive characteristic) youth?

What theory truly accounts for all the facts about humans and their mating systems? This theory must not be a blank slate, must not be happy love monkeys (no adaptations after bonobos? really?) and must not be pure virtuous monogamous/polygynous females (else why the twat squeegees?). It must account for pair bonding, but also for occasional extrapair matings - for complicated but biologically sensible intrasexual and intersexual competition. 

There is no reason that a polyandrous society might not fall within the realm of possibilities of such a theory - given the right environmental or population constraints and the right social institutions. Indeed, in the article quoted at the beginning of this post, Starkweather and Hames find 53 societies that practice polyandry outside the classical societies surveyed by Murdock. While still a "tiny minority" of human societies, polyandry is a sensible model for the tiny minority of societies experiencing certain constraints.

What is the single biggest determinant of a society going polyandrous? It is, say Starkweather and Hames, a male-skewed operational sex ratio. That is, when there are way more males than females in a society, polyandry is a likely solution to that problem. This is true whether the operational sex ratio is temporarily skewed (by an unusual war), or permanently so (by, say, the practice of whale hunting). Temporary polyandry follows temporarily skewed sex ratios; stable polyandry follows stably-skewed sex ratios. There is evidence that the overall operational sex ratio in the Western world and China has become mildly male-skewed in recent decades; even this relatively mild skew has had measurable, culture-dependent effects.

Do we know of any communities that have massively male-skewed sex ratios?

Yeah, that would be us.

Who are "we"? We might identify as rationalist nerds. Many of us have IQs a couple-few standard devs above average, and many of us enjoy some form of Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Many of us read LessWrong, or are at least aware of LessWrong enough to pretend not to read LessWrong. Many of us pass through Senior House or East Campus at MIT; others, through Blacker House or Ricketts House at CalTech. We are particularly likely to chew nicotine gum despite never having smoked cigarettes (which only scratches the surface of our drug use). 

To some limping extent, we form a semi-endogamous community. How sex-skewed are we? Taking LessWrong as a sample of whatever we are, according to the 2011 survey, we are 89% male. An operational sex ratio of 204 males to 100 females, as found in Netsilik children, is considered extremely high, and is highly determinative of polyandry. Our LessWrong operational sex ratio would be 1056 males per 100 females.

This is gender skewing beyond what would be expected based on mere IQ; in the Scottish sample, there were 203 girls and 277 boys in the 140 band of the IQ test, for a skewed-but-not-ludicrous operational sex ratio of 136 boys per 100 girls. Whatever we are, we are not selecting in merely for intelligence, but likely also for other factors that are heavily dependent on sex.

As someone who lettered in both math team and cheerleading, polyandry has been a reality of my dating life since I was 16. (I am Presently in a Monogamous Relationship Okay.) Polyamory was already a buzzword at MIT in the mid-1990s, but my girlfriends and I didn't need anyone to tell us that we could have whoever we wanted PLUS whoever else we wanted, PLUS set all the rules, and if anybody didn't like it, they were mean, jealous crybabies. This is pretty much totally unfair, and I guess our emotional response to this unfairness was something like, "well, patriarchy sucked, payback's a bitch." 

However, despite the unfairness, it is not at all clear that the polyandrous polyamorous system in place in many elite bohemian communities is undesirable for the males involved. Indeed, many males in this system actively seek to promote it; this comment from Eliezer Yudkowsky is one of my favorite examples:

The following is a public service announcement to all women who naturally like at least some shy nerds.

If you are (1) polyamorous and (2) able to directly ask men you find attractive to sleep with you (instead of doing the sheep dance where you freeze motionless and wait for them to approach) - or if you can hack yourself to be like that without too much effort - it is vastly easier than you imagine to acquire an entire harem of high-status and/or handsome nerds.

(For some but not all nerds, this may require that you be reasonably attractive. Most nerd girls I know are reasonably attractive and think they are not. So if you think that you're overweight and hideous and yet oddly enough nerds spend a lot of time talking to you at nerd parties, this means you are pretty.)

This concludes the public service announcement.

In addition to the high male-skewed operational sex ratio, we have many things going for us as a community in terms of determinants of successful polyandry. For one thing, our males, I offer, seem to experience less sexual jealousy than average human males. Whether this is mostly a result of their biological characteristics, or mostly a result of cultural norms against jealousy, it does seem to be effective in suppressing most open expression of hostile jealousy. 

Also, we are generally socially broken and pathologically interested in a lot of other things besides social monkey crap. (I mean this as a very high compliment.) We are still monkeys, but we are able to get a lot of our happiness, status, and belonging from sources other than a monogamous pair bond. Since we have often failed to develop healthy social instincts, we are not hampered by these instincts as much as the regular monkeys seem to be.

However, the reason I wrote this is to caution against a stupid, blank-slatey ideal of natural polyamory, and to challenge the community to think harder and create institutions that can make polyandry work and solve its inherent problems. 

The 53 societies Starkweather et al. identified as polyandrous were identified as such based on a marriage-like institution: rights and obligations toward each other and toward any children of the union, along with some degree of limitation of sexual access to others outside the union. Right now, it doesn't look to me like nerd polyamory has almost any institutions or expectations by the community about partners' rights and duties toward each other. Any kind of right or duty is looked at askance; each relationship group is expected to hammer out its own institutions from scratch. 

It's amazing that this is controversial, but I argue that relationship norms are part of our cultural package, and we rely on them both to be secure and to feel secure in our relationships. It's demonstrably not stupid to think that polyandry could be part of our relationship norms; but it is, I think, stupid to think we don't need any norms or institutions at all. 

While we do seem to be low on male sexual jealousy, humans as a species tend to exhibit violent male sexual jealousy; wife-killing is the least culturally variable portion of homicides, and violent sexual jealousy is a frequent motive in male-male homicides as well (see, e.g., Daly & Wilson, Homicide, "The Logic of Same-Sex Conflict"). This represents only the visible tail of jealous violence. While discouragement of jealousy is probably awesome as a sexual norm, I suspect that the outright DENIAL of the existence of jealousy may be harmful. We haven't had a community murder yet that we know of, but what are we doing to make sure it never happens? And what can we do to prevent not just the expression of jealousy, but the painful experience of jealousy? How can we avoid ending up like those people on Proles Behaving Badly?

There are two related problems that may be exacerbated by polyamory: low-status male celibacy and sliminess. While polyandry probably does a better job of managing male intrasexual conflict over females than monogamy in a sex-skewed community, those unfortunate males in the lowest status quadrant are frequently left partnerless; even a Zipgirl membership is a status good when there are 1056 males for every 100 females, and our community is not somehow magically invulnerable to hypergamy. Sliminess is the problem of guys (not just low-status guys) sliming all over women when there aren't clear boundaries preventing such sliminess. I am certain this is a problem in monogamous communities, but I suspect it is even more of a problem when even the "taken" girls are not really "taken." We have not solved this problem as a community, and if anything, it makes us less attractive to much-needed women. Sexual attraction is not egalitarian, and our norms must reflect this. Can we be fair without being egalitarian? Can we make our women happy without making our low-status men miserable? I have rarely seen an acknowledgement that these problems even exist (except from the Men's Rights folks, with whom we have some overlap, like it or not), let alone proposals for how to deal with the problems.

A solution to our skewed sex ratio, perhaps even more powerful than polyandry, is chosen bisexuality (what some call sexuality hacking). Can some men who feel heterosexual but want to be bisexual increase their sexual response to other men? How can they go about doing that? Not much has been written on this. While male sexuality is no doubt less plastic than female sexuality, evidence of highly bisexual societies like the ancient Greeks imply that male sexuality has possibilities unrealized in our present world. Can our community tap these possibilities? 

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

The Old Ways

Human technology, like organisms themselves, evolved gradually along with human populations to solve problems posed by different environments. Successful technologies solved problems relating to nutrition, group cohesion, securing territory, and surviving the elements, among many others. 

It is unlikely that the humans who used and gradually changed technologies throughout the ages were aware of all of the functions of their cultural package - any more than we are aware of all of the functions of our cultural package today. A cultural package would reproduce itself by working well enough to be passed down to another generation of humans. Conservatism among simple societies prevented dangerous innovations from destroying the carefully evolved cultural package, but rare successful innovations would occasionally become part of the cultural package. 

Over the past several thousand years, civilization has independently occurred many times. The complexities of civilization have repeatedly added a snowballing load of cultural innovations to human groups, usually resulting in a population explosion and subsequent crash. We are currently likely near a population peak resulting from the greatest innovation snowball the world has ever known. 

The cultural packages that were stable at past times did not evolve to maximize human happiness, but rather, like organisms, to maximize their own reproductive capabilities. A small band of happy foragers could expect to be overwhelmed by a cranky but fecund settlement of farmers; hence, in this example, the farmer cultural package would be reproduced more successfully than the forager package. That said, humans themselves evolved in the presence of past successful stable cultural packages (just as we evolved in the presence of prey species and parasites). Cultural packages that were stable for centuries appear to have done a decent job of providing humans with a sense of meaning and a decent level of wellbeing. 

Should we go back to the old ways? This is both impossible and undesirable. The further back in time we go, the lower the population density norms evolved to support. It is unlikely that the world's present population could be supported in foraging tribes or even simple farming societies. Not only that, but the evolved cultural packages have largely been interrupted; even if we wanted to instantiate them, we would have a hard time finding out exactly what they were. 

Given the search function that past humans used to "find" their cultural packages, it is likely that the cultural packages are local maxima for cultural reproductive success. They are hard-won solutions to complex problems, worked out in the computer of time and human lives; but they are not absolute maxima of anything, and they are not necessarily even local maxima of human wellbeing. Even if we were to go back in time to a pre-civilized society, it is not clear that maintaining existing traditions would be the best way to maximize human wellbeing. It is likely that there are many dimensions along which we could increase human wellbeing at the expense of environment-specific cultural reproduceability. 

Fast forward, however, to the present day, in which existing cultures have moved very far away from evolved cultural packages. In what direction have they moved away, and how has this affected human wellbeing? 

There are two major directions in which cultural packages have changed: toward those norms and institutions that support greater population density (agriculture, Green Revolution, cities), and toward short-term individual preference as dictated by market economies. 

Rich industrialized countries are particularly high in serving short-term individual preference. While these countries have experienced a major reduction in violence over hundreds of years, they also experience new, widespread problems that undermine the very desirability of human life itself. Suicide, for instance, is more prevalent in industrialized countries than homicide. Obesity and depression have both reached epidemic proportions unheard of before the present century. More people live in slums than lived on the entire planet two hundred years ago. 

The old ways (evolved cultural patterns) probably did a decent job of meeting the needs of ancestral populations. These old ways would not meet our needs today. But moving away from ancestral norms based on individual short-term preference is not turning out to be a good way to meet our needs. The invisible hand, it seems, is strangling us. 

We have indulged our short-term preferences at the expense of healthy bodies, meaningful lives, and stable relationships. This is not an indictment of human willpower: we simply did not evolve the capabilities to resist the temptations provided by modern life. 

The old ways are not the answer. Moment-to-moment individual preference is not the answer. Is there an answer?

Tweets by @TheViewFromHell